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Patterson v. Commonwealth
551 S.E. 2d 332 (Va. 2001)
Zirkle v. Commonwealth
551 S.E.2d 601 (Va. 2001)
L Faas
A. Paremon
On the night of October 11, 1987,James Earl Patterson ("Patterson") broke
into the home of Joyce Aldridge (",Adridge") and raped and stabbed her. Shortly
after the attack, Aldridge placed a call to Prince George County Police reporting
the attack When police arrived, they found the front door of Aidridge's home
open and a screen missing from the bathroom window. On entering the house,
police found Aldridge's lifeless body on the bathroom floor. She had multiple
stab wounds; paramedics were unable to revive her. The medical examiner
determined that two wounds to the aorta caused AIridge's death. Police recov-
ered considerable physical evidence, including semen, from the crime scene.1
In 1998, Patterson was incarcerated for a different rape conviction. Hlis
DNA was stored in a Virginia database and was matched to the DNA from
Aldridge's body. Police obtained a fresh blood sample from Patterson, and the
DNA recovered from that test also matched DNA recovered from Aldridge's
body.
2
In March 2000, after corrections officials agreed to allow Patterson to see
his familyat the prison, Patterson confessed to the rape and murder. According
to Patterson, he went to Aldridge's home to steal money for drugs. Although
Patterson had planned to break in through the basement, Aldridge let her dog
into the yard and Patterson decided to go to the front door instead. He asked to
borrow a flashlight, and when Aldridge let him in, Patterson demanded her
pocketbook He then became incensed, tied Aldridge's hands behind her back
and raped her. After raping Aldridge, Patterson decided that he didn't want to
leave a witness behind, and he stabbed her three times in the abdomen. After
leaving the house, he went back in to make sure that Aldridge was dead. When
he found her on the phone to police, he stabbed her "[four] or [five] more times"
and fled.'
1. Patteron v. Commonwveah, 551 S.E2d 332, 333-34 (Va. 2001).
2. Id at 334.
3. Id
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Patterson chose to plead guilty to the rape and capital murder charges.
Prior to the entry of the pleas, two psychologists determined that Patterson was
competent to make the decision to plead guilty. Despite the contrary advice of
defense counsel, Patterson pleaded guiltyto capital murder. At the sentencing
hearing, the Commonwealth produced evidence of vileness and future danger-
ousness, but Patterson refused to present any evidence of mitigation. Instead,
Patterson requested the death penalty, stating that he could not guarantee that he
would not "spark out and ruin more lives."4 The trial court, finding that the
Commonwealth had sufficiently established both aggravators, sentenced
Patterson to death.'
B. Zi~kl
In April of 1999, Daniel Zirkle ("Zirkle") shared a home with Barbara Jo
Shifflett ("Shifflett") and her two children, Jessica L. Shifflett ("Jessica") and
Christina MK Zirkle ("Christina"). Zirkle was Christina's biological father. On
the night of April 3, 1999, Shifflett took her children to stay at her sister's home,
and Zirkle demanded that he wanted his "f-ing girls home now." Shifflett and
Zirkle then had a violent argument and Shifflett called the police. After the
police arrived, Shifflett left the home to stay at her sister's home and obtained a
protective order against Zirkle. When Shifflett returned to the home to obtain
some of her belongings, Zirkle assaulted her and police obtained a warrant for
his arrest. Zirkle was then arrested for the assault and violation of the protective
order and confined at the Rockingham CountyjaiL
6
On August 2, 1999, after Zirkle had been released from jail, he called
Shifflett and told her to "live in hell, bitch." Shifflett in turn obtained another
protective order. On returning to work, Shifflett received a phone message from
Zirkle's motherthat Zirkle had taken Christina. Shifflett immediatelywent home
to find Jessica's body on the floor. When police arrived at the home, they
determined that Jessica was already dead. Meanwhile, an investigator with the
Page County Sheriff's Department was dispatched to Storybrook Trail in Page
County, where he found Zirkle with a self-inflicted stab wound to the neck and
Christina lying face down on his chest, dead from a stab wound to the neck
Zirkle was taken to a hospital for treatment!
The medical examiner who performed the autopsyon Christina determined
that the fatal stab wound completely penetrated her trachea, went between two
cervical vertebrae and severed her spinal cord. The medical examiner opined that
the stab wound required "considerable force" and that Christina could have only
lived for a few minutes. Jessica had five stab wounds to the neck; the medical
4. ld at 335.
5. Id at 334-35.
6. Zirkle v. Commonweath, 551 S.E2d 601,602-03 (Va. 2001).
7. Id at 603-04.
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examiner could not determine which caused death, but opined that either of the
wounds on the side of her neck would have caused death within seconds
Zirkle was indicted in Page County for capital murder for the death of
Christina.9 Zirdle decided, against the advice of counsel, that he wanted to plead
guiltyto the charge. After the trial court was satisfied that Zirkle was competent
and was able to plead "freely, intelligently and voluntarily," it accepted his plea
of guilty. The Commonwealth put on evidence showing vileness and future
dangerousness, but Zirkle refused to present evidence in mitigation. The trial
court found that the Commonwealth established both aggravators and sentenced
Zirkle to death. 0
II Hdd*
The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the death sentences in both cases
pursuant to Virginia Code Section 17.1-313." The court unanimously affirmed
the sentence imposed on Zirkle. 2 The court also affirned unanimously the
sentence imposed on Patterson."
III. Am is /Applioacn V*=m
Although the Supreme Court of Virginia handed down these two decisions
on the same day, the court's inconsistent approach to the proportionality analysis
is worthy of note. In Patescn, Justice Lacy, writing for the court, compared the
facts of the case with several other analogous capital murder cases in which the
death penaltywas imposed."4 Similarly, in Zikk/Justice Hassell's opinion forthe
court compared the facts with those of other capital murder cases in which the
death penalty was imposed. Both cases reached the same result - that the
imposition of the death sentence was commensurate with the crime."
The court failed, however, to set forth a clear and consistent test for pro-
portionality. Justice Hassell explained that the proportionalitytest was an inquiry
as to "whether 'juries in this jurisdiction generally approve the supreme penalty
for comparable or similar crimes."'17 Although Justice Lacy did not specifically
8. Id at 604.
9. S mmUy VA. CODE ANN. S 182-31(12) (Nfchie Supp. 2001) (defining capital murder
as 'the willfuI, deliberate and premeditated killing of a person under the age of fourteen bya person
twent3-one or older").
10. Z/4, 551 S.E2d at 601.
11. Id; Pattmo, 551 S.E2d at 335.
12. Zikl 551 S.E.2d at 606.
13. Patunsc, 551 SE.2d at 336.
14. Id
15. Zdele, 551 SE.2d at 605.
16. Id at 606; Pawpsa, 551 S.E2d at 336.




state a test to apply, both justices seemed to agree that the proper analytical
method was to consider all the capital murder cases reviewed by the court.
According to Justice Lacy, the court in Paecn reviewed not onlycases in which
the death penalty was imposed, but also cases in which the defendant was
sentenced to life and appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia. 9
A. "jwa" or "sv Baies1
One notable inconsistency in the proportionality test is the identity of the
decision-maker in the original imposition of the death sentence. In Zi&k/ejustice
Hassell's analysis refers onlyto juries." Justice Lacy's analysis in Patscmconsid-
ers the decisions of both trial courts and juries.2
The court took another approach in Bede u Cm"nr aMb On proportion-
ality review, Justice Koontz, writing for a unanimous court stated that "we have
examined the records of all capital murder cases reviewed by this Court...
including those cases in which a life sentence was imposed... [and based] on
this review, we conclude that Becks death sentences are not excessive or dispro-
portionate to penalties generally imposed by other sentencing bodies in the
Commonwealth for comparable crimes. 23 The language used bythe Bede court
is imprecise and suggests that the court maybe using a larger data set than simply
the body of cases in which the death sentence is imposed by a jury.
Although the court does not define clearly the term, "sentencing bodies"
appear to be trial judges and juries. In Loz v Cwn;maZlz, 24 the court explained
that the chief executive is not a "sentencing body."" In that case, Lenz, an
inmate at Augusta Correctional Center, was sentenced to die for the capital
murder of a fellow inmate 6 Lenz argued that because the Governor commuted
the sentence of the one individual sentenced to die for inmate- on-inmate murder
under the current statute, sentencing bodies in the jurisdiction had not seen fit
to impose the death penalty in this type of case." The court replied that "we do
18. Id at 605; Pamai, 551 S.E2d at 336 (citing VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(E) (Michie
19%)).
19. Pa vsa, 551 S.E.2d at 336.
20. Zirkle, 551 S.E2d at 605.
21. Patt&mo 551 S.E.2d at 336.
22. Becky. Commonwealth, 484 S.E2d 898,907 (Va. 1997) (holding that death semence was
not disproportionate based on prior decisions of other sentencing bodies in the jurisdiction).
23. Id at 907.
24. 544 S.Ed 299 (Va. 2001).
25. Lenz v. Commonwealth, 544 SEld 299, 311 (Va. 2001) (holding that for senence
review, the Governor is not deemed to be a sentencing body").
26. Id at 301; se also VA. CODE ANN. S 182-31(3) ( fichie Supp. 2001) (defining capital
murder as "the wiflful, deliberate and premeditated kiling of anyperson by a prisoner confined in
a state or local correctional facility as defined in S 53.1-1, or while in the custody of an employee
thereof").
27. Le, 544 S.E2d at 311.
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not consider the actions of the executive branch when making our statutory
determination of proportionality."28 Len is the only case in which the Supreme
Court of Virginia has taken up the question of whether the Governor, in exercis-
ing executive clemency, may be considered a "sentencing body."
Lenz makes it clear that "sentencing bodies" exist only within the judicial
branch, nevertheless, it is unclear whether the court uses the term to refer to
juries, trial judges or both, and it is unclear as to which data set the court is
applying to each individual case. In some instances, the language the court uses
is consistent with the decision-maker in the case being reviewed. In Hake v
Cawmz=M,29 the court reviewed the death sentence of Ronald Hoke, who was
convicted of capital murder and sentenced to die by a jury:° There the court
defined the test as "whether 'juries in this jurisdiction generally approve the
supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes.'"31 In other instances, how-
ever, the language does not follow logically from the decision under consider-
ation. In Dtidcon v Ci G ,32 the court reviewed a death sentence which
had been i ed by a trial judge following a guilty plea to capital muder?'
Despite the fact that the death sentence was fixed by the trial judge, the court
stated that the test was "whether 'juries in this jurisdiction generally approve the
supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes." 3 In Pa w v Cmnummid ,3 8
the court similarlyexplained that "from these cases, we determine whether 'juries
in this jurisdiction generally approve the supreme penalty for comparable or
similar crimes,'" even though it was called upon to review two death sentences,
one of which was imposed by a trial judge.
3
Because it is unclear with which prior cases the defendant's case is being
compared, it is virtually impossible for a defendant to argue persuasively that a
sentence is inconsistent with prior sentencing practices. In Clagm v
m==Ub,37 the defendant argued that the imposition of the death penaltyin
his case was disproportionate because his crime "paled by comparison" with
28. Id
29. 377 S.E2d 595 (Va. 1989).
30. Hoke v. Commonwealth, 377 S.E.2d 595, 596-97 (Va. 1989) (stating that, after consider-
ation of cases in which juries have approved death, the death sentence was "neither excessive nor
disproportionate").
31. Id at 604 (quoting Stamper v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 808,824 (Va. 1979)).
32. 419 S.E.2d 656 (Va. 1992).
33. Davidson v. Commonwealth, 419 S.E.2d 656,657-58 (Va. 1992) (stating that imposition
of death sentence by trial judge was not excessive or disproportionate in comparison to actions of
juries in prior capital cases).
34. Id at 660 (citing Smith v. Commonwealth, 389 S.E.2d 871, 886 (Va. 1990)).
35. 509 S.E2d.293 (Va. 1999).
36. Payne v. Commonwealth, 509 SE.2d 293,298 (Va. 1999) (quoting Stanpff, 257 S.E.2d
at 824).
37. 472 S.E2d 263 (Va. 1996).
2001]
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other cases in which the defendant received a death sentence."8 The court stated
the rule to be "whether other sentencing bodies in this jurisdiction generally
impose the supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes, considering both
the crime and the defendant," but reached the conclusion that "juries in Virginia
customarily impose the death sentence for conduct similar to Clagett's."' This
inconsistency in language exemplifies the difficulty in isolating a body of cases
which a defendant may cite to show that the application of the death penalty in
his case is disproportionate.
B. 7hmBdyjCas6
Virginia Code Section 17.1-313(E) requires that the Supreme Court of
Viginia, in reviewing for proportionality, consider the available records of capital
cases compiled." Once the court reviews all the compiled cases, the court then
compares those cases with the case at bar to determine whether the ruling is
consistent with death sentences imposed by prior sentencing bodies.41 This
analysis is problematic, however, because the Supreme Court of Virginia has
never reversed a death sentence on proportionality grounds.
In Wakerv Qa wa th, 4 2 in which the court undertook for the first time
review of a death sentence under the provision of the capital murder statute
aking the commission of multiple murders within a three-year period punish-
able by death,43 the court explained that the lack of prior comparative cases did
not prevent the court from taking up proportionality review." If the lack of
cases did prevent substantive proportionality review, the court explained, then
it would be impossible to sustain any sentence of death45 This reasoning belies
the fundamental flaw of the proportionality test as the court now conducts it.
Because the court has never overturned a death sentence for disproportionality,
the court has before it no cases illustrative of an instance in which the imposition
of the death penalty was disproportionate.
38. Clagett v. Commonwea 472 S.E.2d 263, 273 (Va. 1996) (concluding that, despite
defendant's arguments to the contrary, death sentence is customarily imposed by juries in cases
factually similar to defendant's).
39. Id (akfiJenkins v. Commonwealth, 423 S.Ed 360,371 (Va. 1992)).
40. VA. CODE ANN. 5 17.1-313(E) (hichie 2000) (providing that the "Supreme Court may
accumulate" records of capital cases and that the cor shall consider such records ... as a guide
in determining whether the sentence... is excessive").
41. Patterson v. Commonwealth, 551 S.E.2d 332, 336 (Va. 2001).
42. 515 S.E.2d 565 (Va. 1999).
43. See aso VA. CODE ANN. S 182-31(8) (Mfchie Supp. 2001) (providing for "the willful,
deliberate and premeditated kiling of more than one person in a three-year period).
44. Walkr v. Commonwealh, 515 S.E.2d 565, 576 (Va. 1999) (stating that "the lack of
directly comparable crimes does not prevent our consideration of whether the sentence imposed
in this case was disproportionate....
45. Id
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In order, then, to have a sample set from which the court can determine
instances in which the death penaltyis disproportionate, it maylook at all capital
murder convictions resulting in a life sentence which were later reviewed bythe
court on appeal" Defendants convicted, however, of capital murder and
sentenced to life cannot appeal their sentences as life is the onlyavailable alterna-
tive penalty to a death sentence. 7 Therefore, the appeals of life sentences
considered in the Supreme Court of Virginia are appeals of trial error rather than
disproportionate sentencing. Moreover, because capital defendants sentenced
to life do not have an appeal of right, at least some of the cases in which a life
sentence is imposed are never considered by anyappellate court and only a few
have reached the Supreme Court of Virginia.48
The lack of a bright line standard for proportionality is problematic for
capital defendants because it is nearly impossible for a defendant to show that a
death sentence was disproportionate. The inquiryinto whether juries or sentenc-
ing bodies have imposed death in similar cases simply means that the court has
a myriad of cases in which a trial court or jury has found the death sentence
appropriate and few in which life was found to be appropriate. Moreover, since
life cases percolate through the Court of Appeals of Virginia and only reach the
court on discretionary appeals of trial error, the court often will lack a full set of
facts to compare with the case at bar.49
Not only does the comparative approach used by the Supreme Court of
Virginia in proportionality review raise a prohibitively high bar for defendants,
but because the proportionality test only requirs a consideration of what past
juries erally have done," defendants almost never will be able to show that the
death penaltyis practicallydisproportionate. Even if a defendant could point out
a case with substantially similar facts in which the jury imposed life, the court
would most certainlylocate several other cases with substantially similar facts in
which the juryimposed death. Therefore, in nearly everyinstance, the defendant
seeking proportionality review faces any number of cases with facts substantially
similar to his in which the death sentence was affirmed, and conversely, no cases
in which death is reversed.
46. SeePaztana, 551 S.E2d at 336.
47. SeeVA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(A) (Michie 2000) (providing thati ncase of trial byjury,
where a sentence of death is not recommended, the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment
for life").
48. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-670 (lichie 2000) (setting forth the causes which may be
brought before the Supreme Court of Virginia on appeal; VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(A) (providing
for automatic review of death sentences in the Supreme Court of Virginia).
49. Sw, eg, Johnson v. Commonweakh, 273 S.E.2d 784, 786.87 (Va. 1981). InJobmso, the
defendant appealed his conviction on double jeopardygrounds. IR at 786. Because the defendant
was appealing a question of trial error, the court offered a very limited statement of facts and did
not conduct proportionality review of defendant's sentence. See id at 786.87.
50. Zirkle v. Commonwealt 551 SE.2d 601,605 (Va. 2001).
2001]
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IV. Candwion
The statutorily mandated proportionality review appears to be an exercise
in futility. As the court continues to state in every case that it has reviewed the
records of prior capital cases and found that the death sentence was "neither
excessive nor disproportionate," it becomes apparent that proportionalityreview
in the Supreme Court of Virginia is not genuine, substantial appellate review, but
a pro forma exercise. The Supreme Court of Virginia has yet to reverse a death
sentence on proportionality, and it is unlikely that it will do so anytime soon.
Thus, it remains crucial that defense counsel preserve all its trial objections so
that the defendant has issues other than those guaranteed by statute on which to
appeal.
Damien P. DeLaney
